Public email posture · checked 2026-09-21

dzen.ru: DMARC, SPF and MX report

What public DNS says about how dzen.ru authenticates and routes email — read the way a receiving mail server reads it, with every change recorded since 2026-09-20.

grade C · monitoring only or weak SPFTranco rank 161 snapshot
Observed configurationPublic DNS only. Nothing here required access to dzen.ru.
DMARCp=quarantine
SPFpresent
SPF lookups1/10
MX1
DKIM selectors1
MTA-STSno
RecordValue
MX10 emx.mail.ru
SPFv=spf1 redirect=_spf.mail.ru
DMARCv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@dzen.ru
DKIM selectorsmail
MTA-STS / TLS-RPT / BIMIno / no / no
Providersinbound: Self-hosted or other
Nameserversns1.mail.ru, ns2.mail.ru
Run a live DMARC checkBuild the digital twinLive tools re-query DNS now; this report is the 2026-09-21 snapshot.

What this configuration means

Each section below is shown because the observed records match its condition. The explanations are reviewed text selected by the data, not generated from it.

DMARC requests quarantine

dzen.ru asks receivers to quarantine mail that fails alignment. Unaligned mail is routed to spam rather than refused, which limits the damage from spoofing while leaving a margin for misconfigured legitimate senders. The usual next step is p=reject after confirming through aggregate reports that no legitimate source still fails.

A single mail exchanger

Inbound mail depends on one published host, emx.mail.ru. That host belongs to Self-hosted or other, which provides its own redundancy behind the name. A single MX is normal for hosted mailbox providers and a risk for self-hosted ones.

DKIM selectors are published

One selector resolves under _domainkey.dzen.ru: mail. Selector names often identify the sending platform, and each represents a signing key that can produce an aligned DKIM path for DMARC — the path that survives forwarding.

No transport-security policy

dzen.ru does not publish MTA-STS, so senders negotiate TLS opportunistically and fall back to clear text if an attacker strips the upgrade. Publishing TLS-RPT first, then MTA-STS in testing mode, adds transport protection for inbound mail without risk to delivery.

Change history

No change has been observed since the first snapshot on 2026-09-20. The domain is re-checked regularly and a new entry appears here when any record above changes.

How to read this report

The grade summarizes two records only: A means an enforcing DMARC policy with SPF hard fail; B enforcing DMARC with SPF; C monitoring-only DMARC or a weak SPF qualifier; D one of SPF or DMARC missing; F neither published. It is a prioritization aid for the public control plane, not a statement about deliverability, reputation or the security of the organization behind the domain.

DMARC policy is discovered with the RFC 9989 DNS tree walk, so a subdomain with no record of its own is reported with the organizational policy it inherits. DKIM selectors are discovered from common names only; a domain may sign with selectors this check does not try. Everything on this page comes from public DNS as observed on 2026-09-21; caches and split-horizon DNS can show different values elsewhere.

If you operate dzen.ru and want a record corrected or the report removed, contact Mailybox.