Public email posture · checked 2026-09-19

facebook.com: DMARC, SPF and MX report

What public DNS says about how facebook.com authenticates and routes email — read the way a receiving mail server reads it, with every change recorded since 2026-09-17.

grade C · monitoring only or weak SPFTranco rank 31 snapshot
Observed configurationPublic DNS only. Nothing here required access to facebook.com.
DMARCp=reject
SPFpresent
SPF lookups1/10
MX1
DKIM selectors0
MTA-STStesting
RecordValue
MX10 smtpin.vvv.facebook.com
SPFv=spf1 redirect=_spf.facebook.com
DMARCv=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:a@dmarc.facebookmail.com; ruf=mailto:fb-dmarc@datafeeds.phishlabs.com; pct=100
DKIM selectorsnone of the common names resolve
MTA-STS / TLS-RPT / BIMIyes (testing) / yes / no
Providersinbound: Self-hosted or other
Nameserversa.ns.facebook.com, b.ns.facebook.com, c.ns.facebook.com, d.ns.facebook.com
Run a live DMARC checkBuild the digital twinLive tools re-query DNS now; this report is the 2026-09-19 snapshot.

What this configuration means

Each section below is shown because the observed records match its condition. The explanations are reviewed text selected by the data, not generated from it.

DMARC enforces rejection

facebook.com publishes p=reject. Receivers that honour DMARC refuse mail using this domain in From unless SPF or DKIM aligns. This is the strongest published posture; it depends on every legitimate sender — including third-party platforms — having an aligned path, and on the aggregate reports the record requests to catch regressions.

A single mail exchanger

Inbound mail depends on one published host, smtpin.vvv.facebook.com. That host belongs to Self-hosted or other, which provides its own redundancy behind the name. A single MX is normal for hosted mailbox providers and a risk for self-hosted ones.

No common DKIM selectors found

None of the selector names commonly used by major platforms resolve under _domainkey.facebook.com. DKIM has no enumeration mechanism, so the domain may sign with a selector this check does not try; absence here is not proof that DKIM is unused. It does mean no platform with a conventional selector is publicly visible.

MTA-STS is published

facebook.com declares a transport-security policy in testing mode. Senders report failures without refusing delivery, which is the recommended stage before enforcement. TLS-RPT is also published, so transport failures are reported.

Change history

No change has been observed since the first snapshot on 2026-09-17. The domain is re-checked regularly and a new entry appears here when any record above changes.

How to read this report

The grade summarizes two records only: A means an enforcing DMARC policy with SPF hard fail; B enforcing DMARC with SPF; C monitoring-only DMARC or a weak SPF qualifier; D one of SPF or DMARC missing; F neither published. It is a prioritization aid for the public control plane, not a statement about deliverability, reputation or the security of the organization behind the domain.

DMARC policy is discovered with the RFC 9989 DNS tree walk, so a subdomain with no record of its own is reported with the organizational policy it inherits. DKIM selectors are discovered from common names only; a domain may sign with selectors this check does not try. Everything on this page comes from public DNS as observed on 2026-09-19; caches and split-horizon DNS can show different values elsewhere.

If you operate facebook.com and want a record corrected or the report removed, contact Mailybox.