What this configuration means
Each section below is shown because the observed records match its condition. The explanations are reviewed text selected by the data, not generated from it.
DMARC enforces rejection
google.com publishes p=reject. Receivers that honour DMARC refuse mail using this domain in From unless SPF or DKIM aligns. This is the strongest published posture; it depends on every legitimate sender — including third-party platforms — having an aligned path, and on the aggregate reports the record requests to catch regressions.
SPF ends in soft fail
Unlisted sources produce softfail: receivers are asked to accept but mark the message. Under DMARC a softfail counts as an SPF failure, so the practical protection comes from DMARC policy rather than from ~all itself. Moving to -all is appropriate once the sender inventory is confirmed complete.
A single mail exchanger
Inbound mail depends on one published host, smtp.google.com. That host belongs to Google Workspace, which provides its own redundancy behind the name. A single MX is normal for hosted mailbox providers and a risk for self-hosted ones.
No common DKIM selectors found
None of the selector names commonly used by major platforms resolve under _domainkey.google.com. DKIM has no enumeration mechanism, so the domain may sign with a selector this check does not try; absence here is not proof that DKIM is unused. It does mean no platform with a conventional selector is publicly visible.
MTA-STS is published
google.com declares a transport-security policy in enforce mode. Conforming senders refuse to deliver without authenticated TLS and refuse mail exchangers not listed in the policy — a strong posture that requires the policy to be updated whenever MX changes. TLS-RPT is also published, so transport failures are reported.
Sending platforms visible in DNS
Public records reference one platform: Google Workspace. Each SPF include or DKIM selector is an authorization that someone must own. Platforms no longer in use remain authorized until the records are removed.
Change history
No change has been observed since the first snapshot on 2026-09-17. The domain is re-checked regularly and a new entry appears here when any record above changes.
How to read this report
The grade summarizes two records only: A means an enforcing DMARC policy with SPF hard fail; B enforcing DMARC with SPF; C monitoring-only DMARC or a weak SPF qualifier; D one of SPF or DMARC missing; F neither published. It is a prioritization aid for the public control plane, not a statement about deliverability, reputation or the security of the organization behind the domain.
DMARC policy is discovered with the RFC 9989 DNS tree walk, so a subdomain with no record of its own is reported with the organizational policy it inherits. DKIM selectors are discovered from common names only; a domain may sign with selectors this check does not try. Everything on this page comes from public DNS as observed on 2026-09-19; caches and split-horizon DNS can show different values elsewhere.
If you operate google.com and want a record corrected or the report removed, contact Mailybox.