What this configuration means
Each section below is shown because the observed records match its condition. The explanations are reviewed text selected by the data, not generated from it.
DMARC enforces rejection
linkedin.com publishes p=reject. Receivers that honour DMARC refuse mail using this domain in From unless SPF or DKIM aligns. This is the strongest published posture; it depends on every legitimate sender — including third-party platforms — having an aligned path, and on the aggregate reports the record requests to catch regressions.
SPF ends in soft fail
Unlisted sources produce softfail: receivers are asked to accept but mark the message. Under DMARC a softfail counts as an SPF failure, so the practical protection comes from DMARC policy rather than from ~all itself. Moving to -all is appropriate once the sender inventory is confirmed complete.
DKIM selectors are published
One selector resolves under _domainkey.linkedin.com: google. Selector names often identify the sending platform, and each represents a signing key that can produce an aligned DKIM path for DMARC — the path that survives forwarding.
No transport-security policy
linkedin.com does not publish MTA-STS, so senders negotiate TLS opportunistically and fall back to clear text if an attacker strips the upgrade. Publishing TLS-RPT first, then MTA-STS in testing mode, adds transport protection for inbound mail without risk to delivery.
BIMI record present
A BIMI record is published at default._bimi.linkedin.com. Logo display additionally requires an enforcing DMARC policy — which this domain has and, at most providers, a verified mark certificate.
Change history
No change has been observed since the first snapshot on 2026-09-20. The domain is re-checked regularly and a new entry appears here when any record above changes.
How to read this report
The grade summarizes two records only: A means an enforcing DMARC policy with SPF hard fail; B enforcing DMARC with SPF; C monitoring-only DMARC or a weak SPF qualifier; D one of SPF or DMARC missing; F neither published. It is a prioritization aid for the public control plane, not a statement about deliverability, reputation or the security of the organization behind the domain.
DMARC policy is discovered with the RFC 9989 DNS tree walk, so a subdomain with no record of its own is reported with the organizational policy it inherits. DKIM selectors are discovered from common names only; a domain may sign with selectors this check does not try. Everything on this page comes from public DNS as observed on 2026-09-21; caches and split-horizon DNS can show different values elsewhere.
If you operate linkedin.com and want a record corrected or the report removed, contact Mailybox.